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EXPERIMENTS IN AGENCY JUSTICE:
INFORMAL ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTS
The 1961 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act and most
state administrative procedure acts ("APAs") provide for only one type
of agency adjudication: a formal, trial-type hearing.I The 1981 Model
Act and five state APAs have departed from this approach by providing
additional, more informal2 adjudicatory procedures. 3
This Comment examines the developments since 1961 that prompted
the drafters of these acts to include informal procedures. The major im-
petus for the change was the "due process explosion," which extended
hearing rights to interests that had been considered too minor for formal
hearings. 4 The Comment then compares the 1981 Model Act and the five
state acts that contain informal procedures. The acts vary on three major
issues that determine their effectiveness in dealing with the due process
explosion. These three issues are: (1) the way that the act determines
whether there is a right to a hearing, (2) the choice between formal and
informal procedures, and (3) the procedural elements required at each
level of proceeding. The Comment concludes that the 1981 Model Act is
the most effective of the acts because it strikes the best balance between
individual rights and the need for agency efficiency.
I. THE NEED FOR VARIABLE DUE PROCESS
Most state APAs are based at least in part on the 1961 Model Act,
1. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PRoc. AcT §§ 9-16 (1961) (revised 1981) (hereinafter cited as 1961
MODEL AcT). See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A. 12-.18 (West 1978 and Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15.0418-.0422 (West 1977 and Supp. 1982); N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PROc. Acr, §§ 301-501
(McKinney Supp. 1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 183.413-.470 (1981); WASH. REv. CODE §§
34.04.090-.120 (1981).
2. The word "informal" is used in this Comment to refer to hearings that have less procedural
detail than a full formal hearing. Professor Bonfield, reporter for the 1981 Model Act, thinks that
"informal" is a troublesome term when describing hearings of less than "full contested case" com-
plexity. He feels that "informal" carries excess conceptual baggage and that a more accurate charac-
terization of alternative schemes of adjudicatory procedures would be "ascending/descending levels
of complexity." Telephone interview with Arthur E. Bonfield, Reporter, Uniform Law Commission-
ers' Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981), Professor of Law, University of Iowa (April
26, 1982) (notes of the interview on file with the Washington Law Review).
3. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. AcT §§ 4-401 to 4-506 (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981
MODEL AcT); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10123 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2) (West
Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-604 (1981); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:11 (Michie 1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 227.01(2), 227.07-. 13 (West Supp. 1982).
4. See infra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
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which does not include informal adjudicatory procedures. 5 The inclusion
of uniform informal procedures in the 1981 Model Act and the five state
acts is a response to three recent developments: (1) the "due process ex-
plosion" that has broadened the range of issues requiring a hearing; (2)
the recognition that uniform informal procedures are important to ensure
fairness in agency actions; and (3) the weakening of resistance to less-
than-formal adjudicatory procedures.
A. The "Due Process Explosion"
Under the 1961 Model Act and the majority of state acts, formal hear-
ing requirements are triggered whenever a hearing is "required by law." 6
This formal hearing requirement extends to hearings required by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 The "due process explo-
sion" has greatly expanded this class of cases. The "explosion" began in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 8 when the United States Supreme Court held that the
fourteenth amendment requires that a state provide a hearing before it can
terminate welfare benefits. Since Goldberg, courts have held that hear-
ings are required before termination of Medicare benefits, 9 eviction from
a public housing project,' 0 debarment of a contractor from further gov-
ernment contracts, 1 and deprivation of a prisoner's "good time"
credit. 12
As the Court expanded the reach of the fourteenth amendment, 1 3 it rec-
5. The 1961 Model Act adjudicatory provisions apply only to -contested cases," which are de-
fined as "proceedingis] . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by
law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." 1961 MODEL Acr. supra note
1. § 1(2).
The procedure mandated by these provisions is a formal hearing. Parties must receive notice and an
opportunity to present evidence and argument. A full record is required. and the findings of fact must
be based exclusively on that record. Cross-examination is allowed and civil rules of evidence apply.
except that hearsay is admissible. Ex parte consultations between an agency decisionmaker and a
party to the case are not allowed. Id. §§ 9-13.
6. 1961 MODEL ACr, supra note 1, § 1(2). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(2) (West
Supp. 1982): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-2(b) (West Supp. 1982); WASt. REV. CODE § 34.04.010
(1981).
7. Hearings "required by the Constitution" are clearly among the hearings "required by law.'"
Hearings required by the Constitution trigger the federal APA adjudicatory provisions even though
that statute reads only "required by statute." Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33.50 (1950).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. Martinezv. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121 (10thCir. 1973).
10. Escalera v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
I1. W.G. Cosby Transfer and Storage Corp. v. Froehlke. 480 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973).
12. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). But see Leis v. Flynt. 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (right
of out-of-state lawyer to appear pro haec vice in an Ohio court is not protected by due process).
13 Prior to the 1970's, the Court used the right/privilege distinction to determine whether a
person was entitled to a hearing. Under this analysis, no hearing was required if the interest at stake
was deemed a mere privilege. In Goldberg, the Court refused to apply the right/privilege distinction
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ognized that due process requirements are flexible. In Goss v. Lopez, 14
the Court held that, for public high school students facing a ten-day sus-
pension, due process was satisfied by notice of the charges and an oppor-
tunity to respond informally. 15 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 16 the Court ap-
proved a similar informal procedure to determine continuing entitlement
to Social Security disability payments. 17 The "variable due process"
concept recognized in Goss and Mathews is a logical corollary of the ex-
pansion of hearing rights. 18
The "due process explosion" and the Supreme Court's recognition of
variable due process leave the 1961 Model Act and the similar state acts
in a peculiar position. Because the adjudicatory provisions apply when-
ever due process requires a hearing, the state acts mandate formal, trial-
type hearings in inappropriate circumstances. 19 Although the Supreme
Court recognizes that the procedural requirements of these hearings are
to welfare benefits. 397 U.S. at 262. The Court later formally rejected the privilege concept in Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Roth Court restricted due process
protection, however, by requiring a showing that the interest at stake comes within the meaning of
"liberty" or "property" as used in the fourteenth amendment. 408 U.S. at 576-77. It has been
suggested that this method is in fact a return to the privilege concept. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW § 81, at 232 (1976); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11:4, at 207 (2d
ed. Supp. 1982) ("the privilege doctrine . . . is not only alive but hale and hearty"). Further dis-
cussion of what interests are protected by due process is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is
sufficient to note that, although the breadth of due process protection remains uncertain, the due
process explosion has extended it beyond previous limits. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 10:1 (2d ed. 1979).
14. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
15. Id. at 577-84.
16. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
17. The Mathews Court developed a test to determine when a less rigorous procedure will satisfy
due process, once it is decided that the interest at stake is constitutionally protected. The test requires
a balancing of three factors: the individual's interest, the government's interest, and the risk of er-
roneous deprivation of the individual's interest under the procedure in question. Id. at 335.
Professor Davis finds these factors "far from satisfactory" because they do not consider the kind
of question to be decided, e.g., whether there are factual or only policy issues involved. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13:12 (2d ed. Supp. 1982).
18. "Vriable due process" is needed to lighten the agencies' burden of providing the increased
number of required hearings. The Supreme Court has considered a formal hearing unnecessary for a
wide range of interests. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (termination of disabil-
ity payments); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten-day suspension from high school); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison discipline); Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation).
19. Goss provides a good example of this tendency. Under most state APAs, a student facing a
ten-day suspension from high school is entitledto a formal hearing. Agencies previously were free to
handle such minor cases informally because the provisions of the APA did not apply. Because the
"due process explosion" makes APA provisions applicable to lesser interests, the agencies can no
longer use informal disposition. Although the parties may waive the formal hearing, see, e.g., 1961
MODEL Acr, supra note 1, § 9(d), the agency cannot unilaterally choose to dispose of the case infor-
mally.
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flexible, the state acts lack the informal procedures necessary to imple-
ment variable due process and accommodate the additional cases. 20
B. Extending Uniformity
A recent issue in American administrative law has been the extension
of procedural uniformity to informal agency action that is now beyond the
reach of APAs. 2' Professor Davis has been the strongest advocate of this
effort. 22 He argues that, because over ninety percent of agency action is
informal, 23 standardizing informal agency procedures will significantly
20. Professor Bonfield has suggested a strategy to enable an APA with only one adjudicatory
procedure to accommodate variable due process. Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudi-
cation Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 IOWA L. REV. 285, 360-63 (1977). He
proposed using piecemeal legislation to exempt specific proceedings from the formal hearing provi-
sions. Thus, interests that are now protected by the fourteenth amendment but are too minor for
formal hearings could be individually exempted.
Bonfield considered this approach advantageous because requiring the legislature to perform an
affirmative act provides an opportunity for careful scrutiny of each potential relaxation of procedure.
The protections afforded by a formal hearing would continue until the legislature granted an exemp-
tion. This is a perceived advantage, however, only if one accepts the premise that too much protec-
tion can never hinder the rights of the individual. Professor Davis has questioned that premise; in his
opinion, informal procedures are more effective in certain situations. For example, Davis considers
an informal procedure preferable for welfare hearings because in more than 98% of the welfare cases
the recipient is unrepresented and therefore cannot take advantage of formal procedures such as cross-
examination. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13:8 at 497 (2d ed. 1979).
Bonfield's proposal would place the burden upon the agencies to convince the legislature of the
need for a particular exemption. This burden should deter agencies from seeking to exempt cases that
call for a formal hearing because of the difficulty in persuading the legislature that the exemption is
warranted. Thus, agency tendencies to increase efficiency at the cost of individual protection are
checked.
The disadvantages of this approach are that it requires individual legislation for minor situations
and forces agencies to provide unnecessary and potentially undesirable formal hearings until the leg-
islature acts. Moreover, once these proceedings are statutorily exempted there is no uniform procedu-
ral guarantee. This increases agency discretion and the danger of arbitrary action. See infra notes
21-25 and accompanying text.
Professor Bonfield himself ultimately concluded that the piecemeal approach was an inadequate
method for one-hearing APAs to cope with variable due process. In the last pages of his article, he
suggested that several different levels of procedure would be more workable and sensible. Bonfield.
supra, at 364-65. His position on this issue is confirmed because he was one of the two Reporters of
the 1981 Model Act, which includes three adjudicatory procedures.
21. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:5 (2d ed. 1978).
22. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971). Professor Davis' recommendations extend
beyond procedures for informal agency adjudication: "Not many questions for discretionary justice
ever reach the stage of adjudication, whether formal or informal. Discretionary justice includes initi-
ating, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, contracting, dealing, advising, threatening.
publicizing, concealing, planning, recommending, supervising." Id. at 22.
23. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:1 at 158 (2d ed. 1979). See also Verkuil, A
Study ofInformal Adjudication Procedures. 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739. 741 (1976) ("the phrase 'infor-
mal adjudication' describes about 90 percent of what the government does with respect to the individ-
ual").
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improve the quality of American justice.24 Without a prescribed proce-
dure, agencies have unchecked discretion over informal action. For ex-
ample, an agency may act arbitrarily if it does not need to disclose the
grounds for its decision. 25 Uniform procedures that impose a duty on
agencies to listen and respond ensure at least a minimum of fairness for
informal actions.
C. Subsiding Resistance to Informal Proceduresf
The American legal community has traditionally equated fairness with
a full trial-type hearing complete with cross-examination, a written rec-
ord, and other formal requirements. 26 This position is unsound as a prac-
tical matter. Some controversies are too minor to warrant the expense of a
formal hearing. Because a party to a minor controversy is unlikely to hire
an attorney, many of the procedural elements of a formal hearing will go
unused. 27 Further, when the only option is a trial-type hearing, minor
controversies may be excluded from the formal hearing requirements and
may lose all procedural protection. 28
In recent years, however, the bias for trial-type hearings has decreased.
This trend is illustrated by the 1981 Model Act and by the state acts that
include informal adjudicatory procedures. 29 Effective use of these infor-
mal procedures will lessen the bias further. As informal procedures are
structured and standardized, attorneys may be more willing to trust their
clients' interests to less formal procedures. The shift is apparent in other
areas of the law as well. Alternative methods of dispute resolution such as
private binding arbitration are becoming more prevalent as formal litiga-
tion becomes more expensive and time consuming. 30
24. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:1 at 158 (2d ed. 1979): "The strongest need
and the greatest promise for improving the quality of justice to individual parties in the entire legal
and governmental system are in the areas where decisions necessarily depend more upon discretion
than upon rules and principles and where formal hearings and judicial review are mostly irrele-
vant."
25. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 111-16(1971).
26. The all-or-nothing bias has been noted by respected commentators. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13:2 at 477 (2d ed. 1979); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 118 (1971)
("[t]he tendency of courts, aided and abetted by practitioners, has been to refuse to recognize any
middle position between requiring a trial-type hearing and not requiring it"); Friendly, "Some Kind
of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1316 (1975).
27. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13:8 at 497 (2d ed. 1979) (in 98%
of the welfare termination cases, the recipient is unrepresented by counsel).
28. See supra note 20.
29. See supra note 3.
30. See, e.g, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.06 (1981) (authorizing mandatory arbitration for cases in
which the sole relief sought is a money judgment and no claim exceeds $10,000); Burger, Isn't There
a Better Way. 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Stanley, Minor Dispute Resolution, 68 A.B.A. J. 62 (1982).
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II. CONTRAST OF EXISTING MODELS OF VARIABLE DUE
PROCESS
Although the utility of informal procedures is now generally recog-
nized, putting the idea into practice is still in the experimental stage. Only
the 1981 Model Act and the APAs of Florida, Wisconsin, Virginia, Dela-
ware, and Montana provide an alternative to the formal hearing proce-
dure. 3 1 These six acts incorporate variable due process with varying de-
grees of effectiveness.
The decision to include informal procedures raises several crucial is-
sues. Most crucial is the determination of the right to "some kind of hear-
ing." 32 The availability of informal procedures allows for more generous
hearing rights because hearings will be less burdensome on agencies.
Some of the acts, however, restrict hearing rights to limit the use of the
formal hearing. 33 This undermines the effectiveness of informal pro-
cedures by excluding appropriate cases.
The next important issue is the method of choosing the cases that are to
be handled by the informal procedure. The choice must strike a balance
between protecting individual rights and promoting agency efficiency. In-
formal procedures cannot be used when due process requires full
procedural protection. If the availability of informal procedures is too se-
verely restricted, however, agencies will be required to hold formal hear-
ings in inappropriate situations.34
The final issue involves defining the procedural elements of the infor-
mal hearing. The possibilities range from a limited formal hearing to a
very informal proceeding with only the minimum requirements of notice
and opportunity to respond. Alternatively, an act could include both types
of informal procedure. A scheme with more than one informal procedure
31. The federal APA remains unchanged although amendments to include informal procedures
have been proposed. See. e.g.. S. 2147, 96th Cong.. 1st Sess.. 125 CONo. REC. S 19039 (1979): S.
1663. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reproduced in Administrative Procedure Act, 1964: Hearings on
S. 1663 Before the Subcomin. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Conunittee on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964), reprinted in 24 AD. L. REV. 497 (1972): S. 1070. 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1004 (1959), reprinted in 24 AD. L. REV. 412 (1972). See also AIERICAN BAR
AssOCIATION COMM. ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY. FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 95
(1979) (recommending the addition of a "modified" procedure to the federal APA): Gardner. The
Procedures By Which Informal Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REV. 155 (1972) (proposing an " Informal
Procedure Act"); Hahn. Procedural Adequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking: A Unified Formu-
lation. 31 AD. L. REV. 31. 47-49 (1979) (sample legislation for administrative regulation that pro-
vides for less formal adjudication): The 12 ABA Recommendations for Inproved Procedures for Fed-
eral Agencies. 24 AD. L. REV. 389, 409 (1972) (recommending a new section for the federal APA
that would provide some procedural basics for informal adjudications and require agencies to estab-
lish by rule the full procedural detail to be followed in those cases).
32. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
33. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
34. See infra part 11 B5.
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seems preferable because it can better accommodate the variety in agency
actions. The inclusionr-of-ad-ditional informal procedures, however, is
limited by practical considerations. Several levels of procedure introduce
complications in choosing between levels and determining the procedural
elements of each. 35
These three issues interrelate to a large extent. The approach taken on
one issue can determine the approach taken on another. For example, if
the method of choosing between procedures is inefficient, inclusion of
more than one informal procedure would unduly complicate the scheme
by increasing the necessary choices. 36 Analysis of each issue therefore
requires a consideration of how it fits into an entire adjudicatory scheme.
A. Right to "Some Kind of Hearing"
The threshold requirements for a right to a hearing determine whether a
party gets any hearing at all. The 1961 Model Act and the older state acts
determine hearing rights by external law. 37 In contrast, the 1981 Model
Act and recent state APAs determine hearing rights in the APA.38 This
change is made possible by the additional adjudicatory procedures: be-
cause hearings for minor cases will be less burdensome on agencies, hear-
ing rights can be more generously provided. This change also facilitates
the use of informal hearings by making hearing rights more broadly avail-
able and easier to establish.
1. External Law as the Source of Hearing Rights
The drafters of the early APAs believed that the formal adjudicatory
procedure was too inflexible to accommodate the diversity of agency ac-
tions.39 Therefore, to control the use of formal hearings, they made hear-
ing rights dependent upon law external to the APA. Making external law
the source of hearing rights gave the primary decision on hearing rights to
the legislature and restricted the role of the courts.
The Montana Act retains this older approach. The hearing provisions
are triggered whenever a hearing is "required by law." '40 Informal pro-
35. See infra notes 117 & 122 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
37. Under the 1961 Model Act, an agency must apply the act's adjudicatory provisions whenever
a hearing is "required by law." 1961 MODEL Acr, supra note 1, §§ 1(2), 9-13.
38. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
39. See Bonfield, supra note 20, at 302-04 (summary of the "great controversy" over adminis-
trative procedure acts in the 1940's).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(4) (1981): "'Contested case' means any proceeding before
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cedures are only available when the parties waive a formal procedure. 4'
Because the Act itself does not restrict formal hearings to cases that war-
rant a full trial-type hearing, the legislature must limit the use of the for-
mal hearing.
2. Hearing Rights Created by the APA
An alternate approach is to determine hearing rights by terms in the
APA itself. This makes hearing rights dependent on statutory language
rather than external law. The 1981 Model Act requires a hearing when-
ever a party's "legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests" are affected by agency action. 42 The Florida Act requires a
hearing whenever a person's "substantial interests" are affected. 43 The
Virginia and Delaware acts are more specific. Both require a hearing
whenever an agency will determine whether a party is in violation of law
or eligible for a right or a benefit such as a license. 44
3. The APA and External Law as Sources of Hearing Rights
A third approach uses both the APA and external law as sources of
hearing rights. The Wisconsin Act has adopted this approach. Its adjudi-
an agency in which a determination of legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party is required by law
to be made after an opportunity for hearing." (Emphasis added).
41. Id. § 2-4-603.
42. 1981 MODEL ACr, supra note 3, § 1- 102(5): "'Order' means an agency action of particular
applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of
a specific person or persons."
43. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp, 1982): "The provisions of [the adjudicatory] section
shall apply in all proceedings in which the substantial interests of a party are determined by an
agency."
44. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 29, § 10102(3) (Supp. 1980):
"'Case" or "case decision" means any agency proceeding or determination that a named party
as a matter of past or present fact, or of threatened or contemplated private action, is or is not in
violation of a law or regulation, or is or is not in compliance with any existing requirement for
obtaining a license or other right or benefit.
VA. CODE § 9-6.14:4(D) (Michie Supp. 1982):
"'Case" or "case decision" means any agency proceeding or determination that. under laws or
regulations at the time, a named party as a matter of past or present fact. or of threatened or
contemplated private action, either is, is not, or may or may not be (i) in violation of such law or
regulation or (ii) in compliance with any existing requirement for obtaining or retaining a license
or other right or benefit.
The Delaware Act is analyzed in this Comment because it contains the procedural innovations
under discussion. It should be noted, however, that "although [the Delaware] Administrative Pro-
cedures Act has been in place for four-five years it is rarely used or referred to." Letter from Jack
Gibbons, Research Analyst, Legislative Council of Delaware, to author (Feb. 5. 1982) (on file with
the Washington Law Review). Therefore, there is no available authority from which to draw conclu-
sions about the Delaware Act's application or workability.
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catory provisions are triggered whenever a hearing is "required by
law.' "45 External statutes and judicial determinations of due process thus
form the primary source of hearing rights. A supplementary provision
also provides limited hearing rights in situations where they are not pro-
vided by statute. 46 To qualify for a hearing under the supplementary pro-
vision, a party must show: (1) that her substantial interests are affected by
agency action; (2) that no evidence exists of legislative intent not to pro-
tect the interest; (3) that her injury is different in kind and degree from
injury to the general public; and (4) that there is a disputed issue of mate-
rial fact. 47 These requirements are to be construed narrowly. The provi-
sion is intended to supplement rather than supplant other statutes that pro-
vide hearing rights.48
4. Comparison
If an APA includes informal adjudicatory procedures, the act itself is
the most effective source of hearing rights. Dependence on legislative de-
terminations of hearing rights is unnecessary if an APA uniformly applies
45. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2) (West Supp. 1982):
"Contested case" means a proceeding before an agency in which, after hearing required by law,
substantial interests of any party to such proceeding are determined or adversely affected by a
decision or order in such proceeding and in which the assertion by one party of any such substan-
tial interest is denied or controverted by another party to such proceeding.
(Emphasis added).
46. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.064 (West Supp. 1982).
47. Id. Section 227.064 reads as follows:
(1) In addition to any other right provided by law, any person filing a written request with an
agency for hearing shall have the right to a hearing which shall be treated as a contested case if:
(a) A substantial interest of the person is injured in fact or threatened with injury by agency
action or inaction;
(b) There is no evidence of legislative intent that the interest is not to be protected;
(c) The injury to the person requesting a hearing is different in kind or degree from injury to
the general public caused by the agency action or inaction; and
(d) There is a dispute of material fact.
(2)Any denial of a request for a hearing shall be in writing, shall state the reasons for denial,
and is an order reviewable under this chapter. If the agency does not enter an order disposing of
the request for hearing within 20 days from the date of filing, the request shall be deemed denied
as of the end of the 20-day period.
(3) This section does not apply to rulemaking proceedings or rehearings, or to actions where
hearings at the discretion of the agency are expressly authorized by law.
48. See Judicial Council explanatory notes, adopted to accompany the text of Assembly B. 163,
1975 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1975 Wis. Laws 1306 [hereinafter cited as Judicial Council notes]:
The position of the council is that since this is not the basic statute establishing hearing rights but
is a supplementary device for curing situations for which there should be a hearing but none is
provided, the provision should be drawn somewhat more narrowly than standing provisions in
specific cases. . . .A supplementary statute, such as this one, need not be so broad and should
not be because of the risk of overburdening some agencies with unnecessary hearings.
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informal procedures for minor cases. 49 The act can accommodate the di-
versity of agency action by its range of procedures, and legislative inter-
vention is no longer required. This shifts the legislature's role to deciding
what procedure to apply in various circumstances. 50
Moreover, the use of external law to determine hearing rights may re-
duce the effectiveness of informal procedures. When the legislature fails
to provide a right to a hearing, the effort required to establish a due pro-
cess right to a hearing may exceed the parties' stake in a minor contro-
versy. Use of external law therefore detracts from the availability of the
informal procedures by making hearing rights difficult to establish for mi-
nor cases that are more appropriately handled by an informal procedure.
The Wisconsin mixed scheme tries to cure these defects. Hearing rights
that the legislature overlooked can be asserted under the supplementary
section. This section provides a more certain test than is used for due
process claims. 51 It avoids the narrow construction and uncertainty that
arises when states use external law to determine hearing rights while re-
taining the benefits of legislative participation.
In practice, however, the Wisconsin supplementary section has been
ineffective. 52 To avoid overburdening the agencies, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals has narrowly construed the section to provide a right to an
adjudicatory hearing only when the legislature has already provided a
right to a legislative-type hearing similar to a rulemaking. 53 Although this
49. This dependence is necessary under the Montana Act because informal procedures are not
available for all minor controversies. They can only be used if the parties waive a formal hearing:
otherwise, a formal hearing is required. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-603 (1981).
The restricted use of the informal procedure is the major flaw of the Montana scheme, because it
does not use informal procedures to their best advantage. The increase of hearings required by the
fourteenth amendment has not been accommodated by providing less burdensome procedures. A
student threatened with a ten-day suspension from school would be entitled to a formal hearing, under
the Montana Act. unless the right is waived. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. Unnec-
essary and sometimes undesirable formal hearings are unavoidable if a party desires a formal hearing.
50. See infra notes 54, 66-67 and accompanying text.
51. See Judicial Council notes, supra note 48: "Some 'standing' cases in the appellate courts
based on a denial of due process of law would have been avoided if there were a general residual right
to hearing provision such as the one proposed here.'"
52. The section may also be superfluous in some settings. An attomey for the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Regulation and Licensing recalls no instances of individuals invoking § 227.064. He con-
tends. however, that his department may be "more enlightened in the area of procedural due process
than some other State agencies." Letter from Wayne R. Austin to the author (March I. 1982) (on file
with the Washington Law Review).
53. Town of Two Rivers v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. 315 N.W.2d 377 (Wis.
App. 1981). The court construed the words *'[i]n addition to any other right provided by law" to state
unambiguously that there must be another right provided by law for the statute to apply. 315 N.W.2d
at 381. See supra note 49 (text of § 227.064). Under this construction, § 227.064 would provide an
adjudicatory hearing in lieu of a legislative-type hearing if the requirements in the section were met.
but no hearing rights would be provided where none previously existed. This interpretation is any-
thing but clear and is contrary to the interpretation given in the Judicial Council explanatory notes.
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interpretation is strained, the controversy illustrates that the supplemen-
tary approach can be defeated when courts are overly concerned with
agency pleas for efficiency.
The act itself should establish hearing rights. It is unnecessary to re-
strict the application of hearing rights if appropriate procedures are avail-
able for all cases, even the most minor.
One concern with using the act ,itself to determine hearing rights is that
this shifts the decision from the legislature to the courts. 54 Even if preser-
vation of the legislature's role is a major concern, however, that role can
be retained by giving the legislature a voice in deciding whether a formal
or informal procedure applies. 55
If the act itself determines hearing rights then the standard used to de-
scribe what interests are affected is crucial. When construing this lan-
guage a court will attempt to balance administrative efficiency against the
individual's interests. Although the language should allow courts to grant
hearings freely when the informal procedures offset agency burdens, it
should not require courts to protect every trivial interest. The language of
the 1981 Model Act56 and the language of the Florida Act57 seem to ac-
complish this. Both acts use the word "interest" rather than "right,"
indicating a legislative intent that a court should have discretion in grant-
ing hearings. But the "interest" must be more than trivial, so a court has
some discretion to refuse hearings. 58 The Virginia and Delaware acts de-
See supra note 48. The court apparently interpreted the act narrowly to save the Department of Natu-
ral Resources from having to hold hearings at each of three stages of a waste landfill site approval
process.
54. Bonfield, supra note 20, at 304-07.
55. See, e.g., 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 4-201; infra notes 66-67 and accompanying
text. Professor Bonfield, Reporter for the 1981 Model Act, characterizes the role of the legislature
under that act as "primary" even though the 1981 Model Act determines hearing rights without
reference to external law. Professor Bonfield contrasts the Model Act with a scheme that determines
hearing rights by its own terms but has only one adjudicatory procedure. Under the latter scheme, the
only decision is whether the person has a right to a hearing. Because the courts make that decision,
the APA causes significant "buck-passing" from the legislature to the courts. Under the 1981 Model
Act, a court's decision that a person is entitled to a hearing has less significance because the legisla-
ture makes the crucial decision on the form of that hearing. Telephone interview with Arthur E.
Bonfield, Reporter, Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act
(1981), Professor of Law, University of Iowa (April 26, 1982) (notes of the interview on file with the
Washington Law Review). See also Bonfield, supra note 20, at 304-06 (criticizing the 1974 North
Carolina APA, which was similar to the hypothetical scheme discussed above but which has since
been amended, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Michie 1978)); Daye, North Carolina's New
Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REv. 833, 869-70 (1975) (dis-
cussing the earlier North Carolina scheme).
56. 1981 MoDEL Acr, supra note 3, § 1-102(5). See supra text accompanying note 42.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982). See supra text accompanying note 43.
58. The relative merits of "substantial interests" and "legal interests" is a fine point that may be
rendered insignificant by judicial interpretation. The breadth of either phrase depends on the courts'
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lineate a more specific test for hearing rights. A hearing is provided only
if the agency is determining whether a party has violated a law or is eligi-
ble for a particular benefit. 59 This specificity makes hearing rights easier
to determine but may deprive a court of the flexibility it needs in certain
situations. It may also leave some due process interests, like the "right"
to stay in school in Goss, completely outside the statutory scheme.
B. Choice Between Informal and Formal Procedures
The manner of choosing between formal and informal procedures can
determine whether the latter are used effectively. If informal hearings are
overly restricted, agencies may have to provide formal hearings when in-
formal ones would suffice. If informal hearings are available in too many
cases, due process may be violated.
Several alternative methods exist for choosing between formal and in-
formal procedures. The choice could be left up to the parties. Alterna-
tively, the act itself could specify when each procedure is applicable, or
the choice would be made in advance by agency rulemaking that specified
the appropriate procedure for particular categories of cases.
1. Option of the Parties
One method of determining whether formal or informal procedures ap-
ply is to allow the parties to choose. Montana and Delaware have adopted
this approach, limiting informal procedures to situations where the parties
have waived a formal hearing. 60 The existence of uniform informal pro-
cedures assures parties of some procedural protection and may encourage
them to choose informal disposition.
generosity with hearing rights, and this generosity depends in part on the efficiency of the informal
procedures provided. See 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 4-201 comments.
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10102(3) (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:4(D) (Michie Supp.
1982). See supra note 44 (quoting the statutory language).
60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10123 (Supp. 1980): "Where a formal hearing is not required by
law and where the parties agree in advance to proceed in such manner, the agency shall acquire the
information upon which it bases its decision by means of informal conference or consultation among
the parties ...... MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-603 (1981): "Unless precluded by law, informal
disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or
default. . . . [Piarties to a contested case may jointly waive in writing a formal proceed-
ing . . .. .
The 1961 Model Act also permitted parties to waive formal hearings. 1961 MODEL ACT. supra
note I, § 9(d). The two state acts differ from the 1961 Model Act only by providing basic procedural
rudiments if a waiver occurs.
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2. Preliminary Fact-finding
An alternative approach is to make the informal procedure available to
the agency as a preliminary fact-finding hearing. Virginia has adopted
this approach, allowing informal procedures in all cases unless formal
evidence-taking is required by law. 61 An agency apparently may conduct
a formal hearing instead of an informal proceeding, 62 or in addition to an
informal proceeding which fails to resolve the case.
3. Choice Made by the Terms of the Act
Another approach is to use the act itself to determine which procedures
apply. Florida and Wisconsin have adopted this method, although each
uses different criteria. Under the Florida Act, a formal hearing applies
unless there are no disputed issues of material fact. 63 Because the distinc-
tion is clear there should be little dispute over which procedure applies in
a given case.
The Wisconsin Act bases the choice between formal and informal pro-
cedures on criteria that resemble the distinction between legislative and
adjudicative facts. 64 Proceedings are divided into three classes: class 1
proceedings involve matters of general public interest, class 2 proceed-
ings are primarily concerned with rights of a particular party, and class 3
61. VA. CODE §§ 9-6.14:11, :12(A) (Michie Supp. 1982). Section 9-6.14:11 reads, in part:
"Save to the extent that case decisions are made as provided by § 9-6.14:12 [the formal hearing
section], agencies shall, unless the parties consent, ascertain the fact basis for their decisions of cases
through informal conference or consultation proceedings." Therefore, unless the case is disposed of
by consent or a formal hearing is held, the agency is required to hold an informal fact-finding hearing.
Secton 9-6.14:12(A) states:
The agency shall afford opportunity for the formal taking of evidence upon relevant fact issues
in any case in which the basic laws provide expressly for decisions upon or after hearing and
may do so in any case to the extent that informal procedures . . . have not been had or have
failed to dispose of a case by consent.
The last phrase is ambiguous. However, if the phrase "informal procedures . . . have not been
had" is interpreted to refer to cases when the agency chooses not to hold the informal hearing, the
agency does have statutory authority to choose the formal hearing instead of the informal hearing.
62. See supra note 61.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982): "Unless waived by all parties, [the formal
hearing] shall apply whenever the proceeding involves a disputed issue of material fact. Unless other-
wise agreed, [the informal hearing] shall apply in all other cases."
64. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2) (West Supp. 1982). See Judicial Council notes, supra note 48.
Adjudicative facts are the facts of a particular case of concern only to the parties, and legislative
facts are those which relate to the lawmaking process and therefore have general, far-reaching appli-
cation. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 404-07 (1942); see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 73 (1908); see also FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory commit-
tee's note (discussing fully the difference between adjudicatory and legislative facts).
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proceedings are cases not clearly within class I or class 2.65 The formality
of the proceeding depends on the extent that it involves individual rights,
with class 2 proceedings being the most formal and class 1 proceedings
the least formal.
4. 1981 ModelAct
The 1981 Model Act uses a complex scheme to determine whether for-
mal or informal procedures are to be used in a particular case. Both the
legislature and the agency are involved in the choice of procedure. For-
mal hearing provisions apply unless a statute or agency rule provides oth-
erwise. 66 Informal procedures are unavailable if their use under the cir-
cumstances violates any provision of law. 67 The legislature can thus
mandate formal procedures for particular classes of cases. If the legisla-
ture takes no action, the agency is free to promulgate a rule that makes
informal procedures applicable. 68
The Act lists specific categories of cases for which informal procedures
are acceptable. 69 There are two lists of categories because the Model Act
65. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2) (West Supp. 1982):
There are 3 classes of contested cases as follows:
(a) A "class 1 proceeding" is a proceeding in which an agency acts under standards confer-
ring substantial discretionary authority upon the agency. Class I proceedings include, but are
not restricted to: rate making; price setting; granting of certificates of convenience and necessity:
the making, review or equalization of tax assessments: and the grant or denial of licenses.
(b) A "class 2 proceeding" is a proceeding in which an agency determines whether to impose
a sanction or penalty against one or more parties. Class 2 proceedings include, but are not re-
stricted to, suspensions of, revocations of, and refusals to renew licenses because of an alleged
violation of law. Any proceeding which could be construed to be both a class I and 2 proceeding
shall be treated as a class 2 proceeding.
(c) A "class 3 proceeding" is any contested case not included in class 1 or 2.
66. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 4-201:
All adjudicative proceedings are governed by this chapter, except as otherwise provided:
(I) by a statute other than this Act;
(2) by a rule that adopts the procedures for the conference adjudicative hearing or summary
adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the standards provided in this Act for those proceed-
ings;
(3) by Section 4-501 pertaining to emergency adjudicative proceedings: or
(4) by Section 2-103 pertaining to declaratory proceedings.
67. Id. §§4-401,4-502.
68. The legislature may have another say in the matter if the particular state has legislative re-
view of agency rules. See Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agen-
cies: Models and Alternatives. 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79, 81-83 (1982) (listing states which
authorize legislative review); Comment, Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?: Gubernatorial and Legis-
lative Review ofAgency Rulemaking Under the 1981 Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REv. 669. 673 (1982)
(same).
69. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, §§ 4-401. 4-502. See infra notes 71 & 73 (text of these
sections reprinted). The category lists are set off in brackets, indicating that they are optional provi-
sions of the 1981 Model Act.
Informal Adjudicatory Procedures
has two informal procedures: the conference hearing and the summary
hearing. 70 The more formal conference hearing is used either when there
is no disputed issue of material fact, or when a factual issue exists but the
controversy involves a minor sanction or less than one thousand dollars. 71
The summary hearing is available only if the public interest does not
require that notice and opportunity to respond be given to nonparties. 72 It
is used in monetary disputes of not more than one hundred dollars, purely
verbal sanctions against a prisoner, student, public employee or licensee,
and "any matter having only trivial potential impact upon the affected
parties. ,73
70. Id. §§4-401,4-502.
71. Id.§4-401:
A conference adjudicative hearing may be used if its use in the circumstances does not violate
any provision of law and the matter is entirely within one or more categories for which the
agency by rule has adopted this chapter [; however, those categories may include only the fol-
lowing:
(1) a matter in which there is no disputed issue of material fact; or
(2) a matter in which there is a disputed issue of material fact, if the matter involves only:
(i) a monetary amount of not more than [$1,000];
(ii) a disciplinary sanction against a prisoner;
(iii) a disciplinary sanction against a student which does not involve expulsion from an aca-
demic institution or suspension for more than [ 10] days;
(iv) a disciplinary sanction against a public employee which does not involve discharge from
employment or suspension for more than [10] days;
(v) a disciplinary sanction against a licensee which does not involve revocation, suspension,
annulment, withdrawal, or amendment of a license; or
(vi). . . .I
(brackets indicate optional language).
72. Id. § 4-502(2).
73. Id. § 4-502(3). Under this section, an agency may pse summary adjudicative proceedings if:
the matter is entirely within one or more categories for which the agency by rule has adopted this
section and Sections 4-503 to 4-506 [; however, those categories may include only the follow-
ing:
(i) a monetary amount of not more than [$100];
(ii) a reprimand, waming, disciplinary report, or other purely verbal sanction without continu-
ing impact against a prisoner, student, public employee, or licensee;
(iii) the denial of an application after the applicant has abandoned the application;
(iv) the denial of an application for admission to an educational institution or for employment
by an agency;
(v) the denial, in whole or in part, of an application if the applicant has an opportunity for
administrative review in accordance with Section 4-504;
(vi) a matter that is resolved on the sole basis of inspections, examinations, or tests;
(vii) the acquisition, leasing, or disposal of property or the procurement of goods or services
by contract;
(viii) any matter having only trivial potential impact upon the affected parties; or
(ix). . .. I
(brackets indicate optional language).
Washington Law Review
5. Comparison
The choice between procedures is crucial. An informal procedure can
only be used for cases where due process allows less than a full trial-type
hearing. Therefore, the method used to choose the procedures must not
make the informal hearing too available. 74 On the other hand, informal
procedures should be used in all appropriate cases to maximize agency
efficiency.
The state APAs have been too concerned with restricting the use of
informal procedures. The Delaware, Montana, and Virginia acts all rele-
gate informal procedure to a restricted role that neither ensures less for-
mal procedures for minor cases, nor enables the agencies to improve their
efficiency by controlling the use of informal procedures.
The Montana and Delaware acts, by allowing the parties to choose,
limit the role of informal procedure to assuring procedural protection for
parties who waive a formal hearing. The agencies derive no benefit ex-
cept in those limited instances. Virginia's use of informal procedure for
preliminary factfinding is similarly inefficient. Although it expedites
some cases, 75 it prolongs the adjudicatory process in others. 76 It also in-
creases the total number of hearings, because a formal hearing is still re-
quired when the informal hearing fails to resolve a case. 77 Neither ap-
proach uses informal procedure to its best advantage. Both agencies and
parties would benefit from making informal procedures freely available
when less serious interests are at stake. These procedures allow the agen-
cies to function more efficiently and assure the parties of appropriate
procedural protection.
Using the act itself to choose between procedures could make informal
procedures available for minor controversies. Nevertheless, this approach
has proven unsuccessful in Florida and Wisconsin because of difficulties
with the criteria in both acts. The Florida criterion, 78 requiring a formal
hearing if a disputed factual issue exists, is easy to apply; but the cost of
74. Constitutional questions could arise if an act sets the threshold for a formal hearing too high.
For example, an act could make the formal hearing applicable only to controversies over $ 10,000. A
welfare termination case may arise that involves less than $10,000 in potential benefits. According to
the Goldberg Court, an agency must provide the full panoply of trial-type procedures before termina-
tion. Goldberg. 397 U.S. at 266-71; see B. SCHWARTZ. supra note 13, § 88 at 248. Under the hy-
pothetical statute, however, the welfare recipient would not be entitled to a formal hearing even
though due process requires it.
75. The informal hearings often result in the dismissal of an action against a party, probably
because they are most often used when there is a predisposition to dismiss. Letter from Richard C.
Kast, Virginia Assistant Attorney General, to the author (Feb. 3. 1982) (on file with the Washington
Law Review).
76. Agencies sometimes use the informal procedure to postpone their decision. Id.
77. VA CODE § 9-6.14:12(A) (Michie Supp. 1982).
78. FLA STAT ANN § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982).
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clarity is unnecessary formal hearings. Although a case may involve a
factual issue, the insignificance of the dispute or the sanction may make a
formal hearing unnecessary. Under the Florida Act, the case is neverthe-
less determined by a formal hearing because there is a factual issue. More
significantly, the Florida criterion makes formal procedures so freely
available that informal procedures are primarily used only when parties
waive a formal hearing. 79 Thus, minor cases continue to receive a formal
hearing under the Florida system.
The Wisconsin Act's criteria,80 on the other hand, are too complex and
conclusory. Although in some cases it is clear whether the major concern
is public interest or private rights, the criteria gives little guidance in the
borderline cases. 81 The class 3 catch-all category is an inadequate solu-
tion because it fails to address the major problem, which is that the con-
clusory categories confer too much discretion on the agencies. In a close
case, an agency can characterize the major concern of the case as the
public interest and use a less formal procedure. Because agencies will
usually prefer a less stringent procedure, it is unwise to give them too
much discretion in deciding which procedure should be used.8 2
The Model Act scheme makes the best use of informal procedures. It
includes the legislature in the choice, requires the agencies to promulgate
a rule to reduce procedural protection, and identifies when the agency
may take that step. 83 This best balances the competing needs of agency
efficiency and individual protection. The legislature's role and the initial
rulemaking proceedings check the excessive application of the informal
procedure. The category lists restrict agency use of informal procedures
to appropriate cases.
79. Letter from Mary Clark, General Counsel, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation,
to the author (Feb. 11, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review). Ms. Clark estimated the
percentage of informal hearings to be as low as five to ten percent of all hearings, because most cases
involve factual issues.
80. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.01 (2) (West Supp. 1982).
81. According to two major Wisconsin agencies, there are no problems of classification. Letter
from David H. Schwarz, Administrator and Chief Hearing Examiner, Wisconsin Division of Natural
Resources Hearings, to the author (Feb. 16, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Schwarz letter]; letter from Wayne R. Austin, Office of Board Legal Services,
Wisconsin Department of Regulation and Licensing, to the author (Mar. 1, 1982) (on file with the
Washington Law Review). Classification is uncontroversial probably because there is very little dif-
ference in the procedures for each class. Mr. Schwarz agrees that the procedures are substantially
similar: "It is my opinion that very few substantive differences flow from the designation of a matter
Class 11 rather than Class I." Schwarz letter, supra.
82. The difficulty with using general criteria in the act is illustrated by Judge Frank's comment
about legal concepts in general: although they may be enticingly clear on first glance, '[o]n close
examination, [they] often resemble the necks of the flamingos in Alice in Wonderland which failed to
remain sufficiently rigid to be used effectively as mallets by the croquet-players." United States v.
Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 923 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945).
83. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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The Model Act is also more flexible, efficient, and favorable to the
public than the alternative acts, because it requires an agency to promul-
gate a rule before an informal procedure is available. 84 Thus, the proce-
dure is chosen before an individual case arises rather than on a case-by-
case basis using vague statutory language. 85 Potentially affected parties
have an opportunity to participate in the initial decision to make informal
procedures applicable. The primary selector is the agency, which knows
what procedures are appropriate for its cases. If practice indicates that
another procedure would be more appropriate than the one originally cho-
sen, the agency can amend or repeal its rule.
The Model Act categories are also best equipped to control agency dis-
cretion while making informal procedure widely available. The specific-
ity of the categories 86 defines clear boundaries, ensuring sufficient
procedural protection for each case. It would be more difficult under the
Model Act than the Wisconsin Act 87 for an agency to manipulate catego-
ries to use a less formal procedure. A list of categories can be more com-
prehensive than a single distinction such as the Florida criterion.88 The
Model Act recognizes those cases that the Florida Act overlooks: 89 cases
that involve factual disputes but where the interest is too minor to warrant
a formal hearing.
C. The Procedural Elements of Each Level of Proceeding
An informal hearing can mean anything from a confrontation on the
schoolyard to a relatively formal procedure with relaxed ex parte and evi-
dentiary rules. The Model Act accommodates this range by providing two
informal proceedings. 90 The Wisconsin Act also provides two alterna-
tives to the formal hearing, 91 but the Florida, Virginia, Delaware, and
Montana acts contain only one informal procedure. 92
84. Cf. I K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 6:38 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing effective-
ness of notice and comment rulemaking).
85. The language would be necessarily vague in order to apply to all administrative actions.
86. 1981 MODEL ACT. supra note 3, §§ 4-401, 4-502. See supra notes 69-73 and accompany-
ing text.
87. See WIS- STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2) (West Supp. 1982); see supra notes 64-65 and accompa-
nying text.
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
90. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 3. §§ 4-401 to4-506.
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.01(2). .07-.013 (West Supp. 1982).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10123 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2) (West Supp.
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-604 (1981); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:11 (Michie 1978).
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1. Two Levels of Informal Procedure: the Model Act
The Model Act provides two informal procedures, a conference hear-
ing and a summary hearing. 93 The two procedures differ significantly and
have different purposes. The conference hearing is a "peeled down" ver-
sion94 of a formal hearing and is intended to be used when not all of the
formal procedural protections are required. 95 It differs from the formal
hearing by omitting a prehearing conference, discovery, and testimony by
nonparties. 96 In contrast, the summary hearing is a bare-bones procedure,
providing only notice and an opportunity to respond, and is intended for
controversies too minor to justify a trial-type hearing. 97 The summary
hearing requires only that the presiding officer98 notify the party of the
agency's view and allow the party to explain her position. 99 If the agency
decides against the party, the presiding officer must briefly state policy
reasons, findings of fact, and conclusions of law that justify the decision,
and must notify the party of available administrative review. 100
These informal hearing provisions apply only if an agency has promul-
gated a rule that makes them applicable for such a case. 101 Because the
applicable procedure is determined before a case arises, the two levels of
informal procedure do not increase the complexity of the scheme. An act
with two or more informal procedures would be too complicated if it
lacked a mechanism for advance determination of which procedure would
be used. This problem would arise, for instance, if the choice between
procedures was made by broad criteria on a case-by-case basis. 102 Under
such a scheme, the availability of alternative procedures could frustrate
the related goals of efficiency, uniformity, and fairness.
2. The Wisconsin Act
The Wisconsin Act also has three classes of adjudicatory proceedings,
including the formal hearing, 103 but the differences between the pro-.
93. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, §§ 4-401 to 4-506.
94. Id. § 4-402 comment.
95. See id.
96. Id. § 4-402.
97. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
98. Unless prohibited by state law, a person exercising authority over the matter is deemed to be
the presiding officer. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 4-503(a).
99. Id. § 4-503(b) (1).
100. Id. §4-503(b)(2).
101. Id. §§4-401,4-502.
102. Examples of the case-by-case approach in choosing between formal and informal adjudica-
tive hearings are the Florida and Wisconsin acts. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text for explanation of the classification system.
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cedures are minimal. All three procedures provide a discretionary
prehearing conference, an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and a
decision based exclusively on the record. 104 The requirements for the
middle level, class 3 proceeding are the same as for a formal hearing,
except that discovery is limited' 05 and notice of the hearing need not refer
to specific statutes and rules. 106 The requirements for the least formal,
class 1 proceeding are also similar. The only additional procedural relaxa-
tions for the class 1 proceeding are that the prohibitions against ex parte
communication are relaxed, 107 a record of oral proceedings is not made
unless requested by a party, 108 and a decision made by less than a major-
ity of agency decisionmakers can be final. 109
3. One Informal Procedure: the Florida Act 1 0
The Florida Act's informal procedure was the model for the summary
hearing in the 1981 Model Act. I"1 Like the summary hearing, it provides
only basic notice and opportunity to respond."12 The opportunity to re-
spond in a Florida informal hearing is more substantial, however, because
the parties can present written or oral evidence and written argument 13
against the agency's action. The Florida hearing's record is also more
fully developed. 114
4. Comparison
The procedural elements of a variable due process scheme raise two
issues: (1) whether the formal and informal procedures vary sufficiently
in complexity; and (2) whether the act should provide more than one in-
formal procedure.
104. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.07(4)_ .07(9)_ .08(6) (West Supp. 1982).
105. Id. § 227.08(7).
106. Id. § 227.07(2) (b).
107. Id. §227.13(l).
108. Id. § 227.07(8).
109. Id. § 227.09(2).
110. The informal procedures in the Delaware, Montana, and Virginia acts are similar to the
Florida Act's procedure. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2) (West Supp. 1982) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 10123 (Supp. 1980); and MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-604 (1981); and VA. CODE §
9-6.14:11 (Michie 1978). Because the ways in which they differ are insignificant, the Delaware,
Montana and Virginia informal procedures are omitted from further discussion.
I1I. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 4-503 comments.
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2) (West Supp. 1982).
113. The omission of oral argument may have been accidental. Levinson, The Florida Adminis-
trative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments. 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 664 (1975).
114. It includes evidence received, all submitted written statements, all matters placed on the
record after an ex parte communication, and an official transcript. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2)
(West Supp. 1982).
Vol. 58:39, 1982
Informal Adjudicatory Procedures
If an APA provides more than a formal procedure, the procedures
should range from a formal hearing to a very informal proceeding, to ac-
commodate the Goss-to-Goldberg15 range of permissible procedures.
The Wisconsin Act's procedures do not adequately cover this expanse.
All three procedures are only variations of a formal hearing. 116 Because
there is no substantive difference between the procedures, the way that a
case is classified has little effect on its subsequent handling. The three
similar procedures only add unnecessary complexity without including
more informal agency actions within the scope of the APA.
The optimum number of informal procedures depends on the method
that an act uses to determine which procedure to apply. If the determina-
tion is made by statutory criteria on a case-by-case basis, it is preferable
to have only one informal procedure. An additional procedure would re-
quire the agency to make an additional, difficult decision in each case. 1 17
In practice, agencies would probably develop informal standards for
cases that arise frequently. Persons dealing with the agencies would re-
main uncertain of their procedural rights, however, because the APA
would not clearly identify those rights. I
The Florida Act provides a good example of an act that popes effec-
tively with a case-by-case determination of applicable procedure. The
scheme is not overly complex because only one informal procedure is
provided. "18 The informal procedure provides critical procedural protec-
tions, including a substantial opportunity to respond and a fall record, so
it is appropriate for more than just the most minor cases. 119 In practice,
however, the case-by-case method of choosing procedures has proven
ineffective because of the inadequacy of the Florida Act criterion. 120
If the choice of procedure is made in advance by rulemaking, as in the
Model Act, the act can effectively include more than one informal proce-
dure. Several levels of procedure are desirable to accommodate the wide
range of agency action. 121 Because the complexity of agency action is a
115. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
117. The decision would be difficult because criteria in the act used to determine what procedure
applied would have to be vague to accommodate the diversity of agency action.
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(2) (West Supp. 1982); see supra notes 111-14 and accompany-
ing text.
119. If only one informal procedure is provided, it should fall between the Model Act's confer-
ence and summary hearings in complexity. A scheme with only a formal hearing and a conference
hearing would leave the lower range of agency actions outside its scope. In a scheme with a formal
hearing and a very informal hearing, the formal hearing would be overworked because the informal
procedure would only provide enough protection for the most minor cases.
120. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The same result has occurred in Wisconsin
because the Wisconsin Act criteria confer too much discretion on the agencies. See supra text accom-
panying note 81.
121. See supra note 18.
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matter of degree, an APA with several levels of procedure can best struc-
ture the administrative process.
The number of procedures must be limited, however. Numerous pro-
cedures increase the complexity of the administrative scheme. This added
complexity is hard to justify if the number of procedures make the varia-
tion between formal and informal procedures insignificant. A better ap-
proach is to limit the number of procedures and allow each agency to
adjust them to fit its particular needs. Because an APA should provide
only the procedural basics, 122 the Model Act scheme is ideal. Its provi-
sions for formal, informal, and hybrid hearings provide a basic structure
for agencies to work from.
Another potential problem with several levels of procedure is that the
natural dividing points of adjudicatory procedures may not correspond to
the natural dividing points of agency actions. This is particularly true for
the wide range of minor cases. Although the serious cases form a rigid,
indivisible class,123 the minor cases are flexible and can receive varying
degrees of informal procedure. 124
On the other hand, it is harder to add procedural elements to informal
hearings than it is to delete them from formal hearings. This difficulty
occurs because the framework of the informal hearing will not support
some procedural devices. For instance, eliminating discovery from a for-
mal hearing does not disturb the rest of the procedure. Adding discovery
to an informal hearing, however, is unfeasible because notice is usually
given just before the hearing is conducted, and because the issues in-
volved are frequently too simple to require discovery.
Because agency actions are more divisible at the lower end of the Goss-
to-Goldberg continuum and procedures are more divisible at the higher
end, mid-range procedures may provide excessive and unnecessary pro-
tection for minor cases. The Model Act's conference hearing typifies this
problem. Although the procedure is similar to a formal hearing, it extends
to very minor cases. The Model Act's treatment of school suspensions is
illustrative. The Supreme Court in Goss required only informal notice and
opportunity to respond before a student's suspension. 125 Under the Model
122. See Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 33 IOWA L. REV. 196. 200
(1948).
123. This is because due process requires full and formal protection whenever a crucial interest is
affected.
124. See supra note 18.
125. 419U.S. at577-84.
Vol. 58:39, 1982
Informal Adjudicatory Procedures
Act, however, the student has the right to a conference hearing, 126 which
is a relatively formal, recorded procedure. 127
This lack of correlation between the procedural requirements of the
middle category and agency demand for efficiency can be cured either by
shifting cases to another category or by reducing the procedural complex-
ity of the middle category. The former solution is impractical. It is impos-
sible in practice to shift a relaxed procedural category to more significant
interests without including rights that demand a full hearing. 128 Because
the categories do not lend themselves to alteration, a better solution is to
reduce the procedural complexity of the mid-range category. This would
greatly improve the Model Act. Minor reductions could be made in the
conference hearing, for example eliminating requirements that the hear-
ing be recorded at agency expense or that the decision be made exclu-
sively on-the record. These changes would allow greater agency discre-
tion in conference hearings. Given the minor nature of these cases, a
reduction in procedure is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION.
The inclusion of informal adjudicatory procedures in APAs can signifi-
cantly improve the administrative process for agencies and for the public.
Agencies benefit because informal procedures allow them to implement
the "variable due process" concept and thereby avoid holding unneces-
sary and burdensome formal hearings. The public benefits because uni-
form informal procedures increase fairness in minor cases, which consti-
tute the majority of agency action.
To achieve these benefits, an APA should make informal procedures
freely available for cases that involve insignificant interests or nonfactual
issues. This requires that hearing rights be established in the act itself
rather than by reference to external law. Using external law is undesirable
126. The conference hearing may be used when a case involves "a disciplinary sanction against
a student which does not involve expulsion from an academic institution or suspension for more than
[10] days." 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 4-401(2)(iii) (brackets indicate optional language).
The summary hearing would not be available in this case, because it may be used only if the case
involves "a reprimand, warning, disciplinary report, or other purely verbal sanction without continu-
ing impact against a prisoner, student, public employee or licensee." Id. § 4-502(3)(ii).
127. Id. § 4-402. The only procedural reductions are that nonparties cannot testify, no pre-
hearing conference is held, and discovery is limited.
128. For example, in the licensing context a conference hearing applies to any disciplinary sanc-
tion against a licensee which does not involve revocation, suspension, or alteration of the license. Id.
§ 4-401(2)(v). The status of licenses has historically received special treatment by APAs because of
the potentially serious effect on the party's livelihood. See, e.g., 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 1, §
14 (special section on licenses). Any reduction in procedure for cases that would materially affect a
license would be unwise, both because it would meet with strong resistance and because licensees
should be given all procedural opportunity to protect their livelihood.
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because minor cases overlooked by the legislature will not get the protec-
tion of the uniform informal procedures. It is also unnecessary because
the informal procedures will lighten the agencies' burden of providing
hearings.
The availability of informal procedures also depends on the means that
the act uses to choose between formal and informal hearings. This choice
should be made prospectively. The Florida and Wisconsin acts show that
using objective statutory criteria to choose the procedure on a case-by-
case basis is impractical. The 1981 Model Act approach is more work-
able. Because the choice is made before a case arises, the criteria used to
make the choice can be more flexible and comprehensive. Agency discre-
tion is checked by the rulemaking procedure rather than by overly specific
criteria which may inadvertently exclude appropriate cases.
Finally, the procedural elements of the informal hearing must be suffi-
ciently informal to promote agency efficiency while protecting the indi-
vidual's due process rights. Although an act may include more than one
informal hearing, this is only feasible if the choice between procedures is
made before cases arise. Otherwise, an additional procedure will increase
complexity and uncertainty, thereby negating any increase in flexibility
due to the additional procedure.
The ultimate function of an administrative procedure act is to strike a
balance between serving agency efficiency and protecting the due process
rights of persons who deal with the agency. Informal adjudicatory pro-
cedures serve this function by simultaneously extending procedural rights
and reducing the agencies' burden of providing hearings. This balancing
function must be considered at each stage of implementing a scheme with
informal procedures. The procedures should be freely available, easy to
apply, and with enough procedural relaxations to justify the additional
complexity of having more than one adjudicatory procedure. On the other
hand, the informal hearing must provide meaningful procedural protec-
tion for the individual in even the most minor case.
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